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"REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION" UNDER
TITLE VII: IS IT REASONABLE TO THE
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE?
THOMAS D. BRIERTON
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the
courts have struggled to resolve conflicts between job
requirements and employee religious expression. Despite recent
surveys1 that show more employers are allowing employees to
display religious materials at work and that about two-thirds of
employers are allowing flexible scheduling for workers needing
time off for religious observance, complaints of religious bias
have increased more than fifty percent since 1992.2 For
example, Sears, Roebuck & Company implemented a policy that
automatically rejected or fired employees that refused to work on
Saturdays for religious reasons. The New York Attorney
General investigated Sears after receiving complaints from its
employees. The company entered into a settlement agreement
that required Sears to create a work schedule to accommodate
employees observing the Sabbath on Saturdays and to train all
company employees who were involved in hiring and training to
deal with religious accommodations. 3
Employers have had difficulty in determining how far they
must go to reasonably accommodate the religious employee. As a
I Julie N. Lynem, Keeping the Faith... Er, Faith: Companies Adjusting to
Growing Religious Diversity in the Workplace, San Fran. Chron., Dec. 9, 2001, at
Jl(noting that while the percentage of companies allowing religious displays had
increased from 24% in 1997 to 75% in 2001, the percentage allowing flexible
scheduling remained the same).
2 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Religion-Based
Charges; FY 1992-2002 available at http://www/eeoc.gov/stats/religion.html (last
modified Feb. 6,2003) (providing the total number of charges alleging discrimination
filed and resolved under Title VII per year)
3 Debbie N. Kaminer, When Business and Employee's Religion Clash, N.Y. L. J.
July 21, 2000, at 1.
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result of significant concerns about employee religious liberties,
a coalition of religious organizations pressed Congress to pass
legislation bolstering reasonable accommodation. In 1994, the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act was introduced in Congress in
order to provide clarity to the definition of "undue hardship."
The Act was reintroduced in subsequent Congress, but never
passed out of committee. 4 The Act was then presented in 1999
as the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2000 and was sent to
the House Subcommittee on Employer Relations. The
subcommittee failed to take it up and the Act stalled out. A
version of the Act was reintroduced on May 23, 2002, by Senator
John Kerry and on April 11, 2003 by Senator Rick Santorum.5
Title VII as originally enacted did not mandate "reasonable
accommodation." 6 In 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines that incorporated
"reasonable accommodation" under the concept of religious
discrimination.7 In 1967, the EEOC revised the guidelines to
require employers to make reasonable accommodations unless
an employer could show a resultant undue hardship.8 In 1972,
Congress amended Title VII to include "reasonable
accommodation" and defined "religion" as including all aspects of
religious observance and practice. 9 In 1977, the Supreme Court
in Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) v. Hardison'° undercut
reasonable accommodation by defining undue hardship in terms
of the de minimis cost to the employer.'1 The EEOC revised the
guidelines in 1980 to explain the Hardison decision and
attempted to gain back the reasonable accommodation ground
4 Id.
5 S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, due to a prohibited classification.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
7 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967).
8 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
10 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
"1 Id. at 84.
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lost by the opinion.12 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court dealt
another blow to reasonable accommodation in 1986 in Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook.13
This article first examines the spirit of the "reasonable
accommodation" provision by reviewing its history prior to its
codification. Second, the article discusses the present state of
reasonable accommodation law by considering how the courts
have interpreted the "undue hardship" term and describing how
district and appellate courts have allowed business interests to
supercede religious freedom through the undue hardship
standard. Third, this article considers the Workplace Religious
Freedom Act and its potential implications. Lastly, this article
concludes that the spirit of reasonable accommodation has not
been realized through Supreme Court decisions.
I. THE SPIRIT OF "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION"
A. EEOC Pre-Amendment Guidelines
Title VII as enacted by Congress in 1964 did not initially
mandate reasonable accommodation. 14 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) raised the issue of reasonable
accommodation two years after the law had gone into effect due
to complaints from religious employees that employers were
refusing to allow them to take time off during the regular work
week in order to observe holy days. As a result, the EEOC
promulgated guidelines concerning discrimination based on
religion. 15 In its guidelines, the EEOC not only prohibited
discrimination, but required accommodation through the
following policy:
The Commission believes that the duty not to
discriminate on religious grounds includes an
12 29 C.F.R. §1605 (1980) (stating that the duty not to discriminate includes an
obligation to make reasonable accomodations).
13 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (finding that a reasonable accommodation was
sufficient and an employer need not accept an employee's alternative
accommodation).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). Congress at the time of the original
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination based upon
religion but did not specifically mandate "reasonable accommodation."
15 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1966).
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obligation on the part of the employer to
accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of
employees and, in some cases, prospective
employees where such accommodation can be
made without serious inconvenience to the conduct
of the business.16
The EEOC used the term "serious inconvenience" three
times in the guidelines when describing the extent of the
employer's obligation. 17 These directives were an attempt to
guide employers on issues of Sabbath observance and religious
holidays. They stated that an employer was not in violation if he
or she closed the workplace to observe some religious holidays
but not others.
Despite what seemed to be strong language in favor of the
employee, the guidelines allowed employers to overrule religious
observances under certain conditions. For example, employees
who accepted a job knowing the job requirements may conflict
with his or her religious observances were not entitled to any
accommodation. 18  The guidelines only required an
accommodation when the employee obtained his or her religious
beliefs after being on the job, and even in those cases, an
accommodation was mandated only if it did not seriously
inconvenience the conduct of the business or disproportionately
allocate unfavorable work assignments to other employees.
The EEOC rewrote the guidelines the following year making
significant changes in the language. 19 In 1967, the EEOC
promulgated new guidelines that attempted to take a stronger
position for accommodating the religious employee. These
guidelines restated that employers had an obligation to
accommodate the religious needs of employees and applicants,
but only mandated "reasonable accommodations" meaning those
accommodations that did not impose undue hardship upon the
employer. The guidelines placed the burden of proof on the
employer to prove that the accommodation was unreasonable.
The EEOC's only illustration of "undue hardship" involved
an employee whose job responsibilities could not be performed by
1G Id.
17 Id. § 1605.1(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(4).
18 Id. § 1605.1(b)(3).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)(c) (1967).
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another employee. The guidelines stated that allowing the
employee to take off work to observe the Sabbath would have
created an undue hardship for the employer. The EEOC for the
first time also acknowledged that, in order to reach an equitable
conclusion, each case would have to be analyzed on its own fact.
B. Congressional History
In 1971 Senator Jennings Randolph introduced legislation to
amend Title VII, which would codify reasonable accommodation
law. Prior to this amendment, the courts refused to fully
recognize the 1967 EEOC guidelines because they fell outside
the literal language of Title VII.20 The amendment passed
Congress and was signed by the President. It added subsection
(j) of Section 2000e which states: "The term 'religion' includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business." 21
Senator Randolph led the charge to amend Title VII because
of the inequity he observed in the workplace. 22  Senator
Randolph acknowledged that he was a member of Seventh-Day
Baptist Church, a denomination that observes the Sabbath from
Friday evenings to sundown on Saturday evenings. In support of
his religious beliefs, the Senator quoted from Exodus 20:9
stating, "From eve unto eve shall you celebrate your Sabbath." 23
On the day of the vote, the Senator outlined three themes in his
speech before the Senate and premised his remarks on the belief
that some employees were losing their jobs because they were
involved in a religion.
First, Senator Randolph argued that hundreds of thousands
of employees belonging to religious sects or denominations that
believe in observing the Sabbath on a day other then Sunday
20 See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329-31 (6th Cir. 1970), affd
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (stating that the 1967 regulation
failed to provide definite guidelines because of its omission of material language
contained in the 1966 regulation).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
22 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972).
23 Id. at 705.
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exist in the workforce.24 The vast majority of employers observe
the traditional Christian holidays such as Christmas and
Thanksgiving, leaving out the minority religions. Senator
Randolph made the point that the nation is pluralistic in its
religious beliefs and as such should protect all religions. The
Senator summed up this view with the following:
[W]here people of a belief feel that insofar as
possible, the law flowing from the original
Constitution of the United States should protect
their religious freedom, and hopefully their
opportunity to earn a livelihood within the
American system, which has become, of course, as
has been indicated, more pluralistic and more
industrialized through the years. 25
Second, Senator Randolph asserted that employees who
work for private employers should have the same religious
freedoms as those employees who work for state or federal
employers. 26 The First Amendment guarantees the right of free
exercise of religion whenever the government attempts to
infringe on religious freedoms. The right to freely believe in the
religion of one's choice and to practice one's religion according to
one's own convictions is a fundamental freedom. Senator
Randolph acknowledged that the courts have not come down on
this issue uniformly but he proposed that Congress intended to
protect the same rights for private employees through the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as the Constitution protects for Federal, State
and local government employees. Senator Randolph concluded
that "it is a well-intentioned amendment, a good amendment, a
necessary amendment, a worthwhile amendment, because it
carries through the spirit of religious freedom under the
Constitution of the United States."27
Third, Senator Randolph asserted that the courts have
failed to resolve issues of religious freedom in the workplace, 28
citing two cases as examples of how the federal courts have
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 706.
28 Id. at 705-06.
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denied employees religious freedoms in private employment.
The first case, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company29 was decided
by the district court in favor of the employee. 30 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit reversed, holding for the employer. Robert Dewey,
a member of the Faith Reformed Church, was employed by the
Reynolds Metals Company as a die repairman for over fifteen
years until being discharged. Reynolds Metals negotiated a
collective bargaining agreement in 1965 that set the straight
time and overtime schedules of employees. Under the
agreement, employees were obligated to work such schedules
unless they had a substantial and justifiable excuse. Employees
assigned to overtime could not be relieved unless they could find
another qualified employee to replace them. Dewey, who
observed the Sabbath on Sundays, refused to work on Sundays
when scheduled. He was able to find replacements for five
Sundays until August of 1966 when he refused to find a
replacement on the grounds that it violated his religious beliefs.
Dewey was discharged from the company when he failed to
report for work.31
The Sixth Circuit held that Reynolds Metals had not
intentionally violated the Act and that the District Court
erroneously applied the EEOC guidelines that were not in effect
at the time of Dewey's discharge.32 The dissenting opinion
pointed out that Dewey refused to find a replacement not
because he was being stubborn, but because, according to his
religious beliefs, it was wrong for an employer to induce another
to work for him on Sunday.3 3 The replacement system was not a
solution to Dewey's conflict. The majority opinion stated that
Dewey's request would have caused chaotic personnel problems
and led to grievances and additional arbitrations despite lack of
evidence in the record of such previous occurrences. The
dissenting opinion stated the following:
The First Amendment right to freedom of religion
has always been recognized as one of the Bill of
Rights' strongest mandates. Even though this
29 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
30 Id. at 328.
31 Id. at 329.
32 Id. at 329-31.
33 Id. at 333.
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right has not been extended into the field of labor
relations, section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act
is a Congressional directive that reasonable
accommodation should be made by management to
the religious beliefs of employees when this can be
done without undue hardship on the employer. 34
The second case cited by Senator Randolph was Riley v. The
Bendix Corporation,35 which was decided by the district court in
favor of the employer in 1971. Charles Riley was a Seventh Day
Adventist who observed the Sabbath from sundown on Fridays
to sundown on Saturdays. Riley was employed as a mechanical
foreman for the Bendix Corporation, which was under contract
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in
connection with the building of missiles to be launched from
Cape Kennedy. Riley was transferred to second shift, which ran
from 3:30 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, five days per week.36 Riley
refused to work after sundown on Friday, requesting an
accommodation that was denied. Following the tenets of his
religion, Riley left work at sundown on Friday, resulting in his
being discharged for walking off the job. The district court held
that the EEOC was not vested with the authority to determine
the burden of proof, and noted that religious discrimination
should not be equated with the failure to accommodate. 37
Senator Randolph believed that Dewey and Riley suppressed
the religious freedoms of employees. He argued that the EEOC
guidelines were correct in mandating "reasonable
accommodation" because it was what Congress intended. He
stated that "[t]his amendment is intended, in good purpose, to
resolve by legislation-and in a way I think was originally
intended by the Civil Rights Act-that which the courts
apparently have not resolved."38
Despite the Senator's intentions to solidify religious freedom
in the workplace, the amendment did not specifically define
reasonable accommodation or undue hardship. During the
question and answer session on the Senate floor, he
34 Id. at 334.
35 330 F.Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
36 Id. at 584.
37 Id. at 589.
38 118 CONG. REC. 705-06.
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acknowledged that employers and employees should attempt to
work out their conflicts.39 Five years later, the Supreme Court
took up the issue of "reasonable accommodation."
C. Case Law: Hardison and Ansonia
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided TWA v. Hardison,40
which defined "reasonable accommodation" contrary to Senator
Randolph's intent. Larry Hardison worked for Trans World
Airlines (TWA) as a clerk in the Stores Department at its Kansas
City base. 41 The Department operated 24 hours per day, 365
days a year. The employees were under a collective bargaining
agreement that included a seniority system and employees bid
for different shifts according to seniority.42 Less then one year
after Hardison took the job with TWA, he became a member of
the Worldwide Church of God. One of the tenets of this religion
was to observe the Sabbath from sunset on Fridays until sunset
on Saturdays. Initially, Hardison transferred to the 11 p.m. - 7
a.m. shift to solve the problem. He bid for a day shift, which he
received in another building and was then asked to work a shift
that included Saturday for an employee on vacation. TWA
agreed to seek a work assignment change but the union was not
willing to violate the collective bargaining agreement. Hardison
refused to work on Saturdays and was discharged as a result. 43
The Supreme Court held that TWA reasonably
accommodated Hardison, reversing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. 44 The Court of Appeals found that TWA had three
reasonable alternatives that would not have caused undue
hardship or violated the collective bargaining agreement.45 It
stated that the matter was left up to the union steward who did
nothing to assist Hardison in finding an accommodation. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and
39 Id.
40 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
41 Id. at 66.
42 Id. at 67.
43 Id. at 69.
44 Id. at 84-85. The District Court held in favor of the defendants. See 375 F.
Supp. 877, 891 (D. Mo. 1974). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed
the judgment holding that TWA had failed to reasonably accommodate Hardison.
See Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 44 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
45 See Hardison, 527 F.2d at 39-42.
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reversed its decision. The Court stated that no accommodation
was possible without causing an undue hardship on TWA and
redefined the term "undue hardship" as follows:
To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis
cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an
undue hardship. Like abandonment of the
seniority system to require TWA to bear additional
costs when no such costs are incurred to give other
employees the days off that they want would
involve unequal treatment of employees on the
basis of religion. 46
The de minimis requirement introduced in Hardison has
created the most difficulty for religious employees attempting to
practice their faith. The Supreme Court redefined reasonable in
terms of a minimally low burden upon the employer, making
most accommodations of religious employees unreasonable.
In 1978, the EEOC held hearings in three locations around
the country to respond to issues that were raised by the Supreme
Court's decision in Hardison.47 Over 150 witnesses testified or
submitted written statements. The EEOC concluded from the
hearings that there is widespread confusion concerning the
extent of accommodation under the Hardison decision and the
religious practices of some individuals and some groups of
individuals are not being accommodated. Some employers read
the Hardison decision as eliminating the requirement to make
any accommodation of religious employees. The Commissioner
noted that complaints of religious discrimination and
accommodation had increased substantially between 1968 and
1977.48
During the hearings, employers expressed their concerns
over what constituted a religion.49 Two issues that seemed to
resonate with employers concerned how to determine the
sincerity of an employee's religious beliefs and which religious
practices were associated with a particular religion. Many
46 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
47 See Hearings Before the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on Religious Accommodation (1978).
48 Id. at 1 (Statement of Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, EEOC).
49 Id.
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employers feared the slippery slope since it seemed that the
religious employee received preferential treatment. The
hearings verified that employers were eager to have the law
clarified by limiting the scope of reasonable accommodation.
Based on the findings from the hearings, the Commission revised
the guidelines to clarify the obligation imposed by the statute.
The EEOC attempted to cut back on the reach of Hardison
by issuing new guidelines that provided substantially more
guidance to employers. 50  These guidelines reaffirmed the
employers' reasonable accommodation obligation and provided
some examples of possible alternatives for accommodating
employees' religious practices. 51 The Commission required an
employer to explore different alternatives with the employee and
to implement the one that was least disadvantageous to the
employee. The Commission stated the following:
Some alternatives for accommodating religious
practices might disadvantage the individual with
respect to his or her employment opportunities....
Therefore, when there is more than one means of
accommodation which would not cause undue
hardship, the employer or labor organization must
offer the alternative which least disadvantages the
individual with respect to his or her employment
opportunities. 52
The EEOC guidelines attempted to preserve the right to a
reasonable accommodation by providing multiple examples and
background information in accordance with the original intent of
the 1972 amendment.
The second case decided by the Supreme Court was Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook 3 in 1986. Ansonia further
limited religious freedom of employees in the workplace. Ronald
Philbrook was a high school business and typing teacher in
Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook became a member of
the Worldwide Church of God, which required him to refrain
50 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1996).
51 Id. § 1605.2(e).
52 Id. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii).
53 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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from work for six designated holy days during the year. 54 Under
the collective bargaining agreement, Philbrook was allowed
three days for religious holidays and three days for personal
business leave. Pursuant to the agreement, a person absent
three days for religious holidays could not use personal business
days for additional religious observance. Philbrook presented
the alternative of either allowing him to use personal days for
religious observance or allowing him to pay a substitute teacher
with no reduction in his pay. These proposals were consistently
rejected by the school administration. 55
The Supreme Court held that the legislative history did not
require an employer to accept a particular accommodation
requested by an employee. 56 The Court mandated that once an
employer had reasonably accommodated an employee's religious
needs, the employer had fulfilled its obligation under Title VII.
The employer does not have to make an effort to show that the
other accommodations were less disadvantageous to the
employee or that they would cause undue hardship.
In TWA v. Hardison the Court voted seven to two, reversing
the circuit court's decision in favor of TWA. 57 The Hardison
majority elicited a spirited dissent from Justices Marshall and
Brennan. Justice Marshall believed that the Hardison opinion
crushed the efforts of Title VII to accommodate the religious
practices of employees. Marshall wrote that the Hardison
decision adopted the very position that Congress rejected in 1972
and in turn, the Court had disregarded Congress' intent.
Marshall stated, "[t]oday's decision deals a fatal blow to all
efforts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to
religious practices."5 8
Justice Marshall believed that the Hardison opinion was
decided in derogation of the congressional intent and, in effect,
trivialized the need for reasonable accommodation. 59 Not
allowing a reasonable accommodation unless the accommodation
is accomplished on an equal basis destroys the essence of the
amendment and curtails religious freedom.60 Marshall strongly
54 Id. at 62-63.
55 Id. at 65.
5( Id. at 68-69.
57 432 U.S. 63, 86-87 (1977).
58 Id. at 86.
59 Id. at 87.
60 Id. at 88-89.
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suggested that the congressional intent and the literal meaning
of the terms may require preferential treatment of religious
employees.6 1
Hardison and Ansonia set the parameters for reasonable
accommodation under Title VII. The courts have affirmed that
an employee must establish a prima facie case by first proving
three elements. In Anderson v. General Dynamics Connair
Aerospace Div.,6 2 the Ninth Circuit established the three
elements as: (1) he or she had a bona fide religious belief, the
practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) he or
she informed the employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the
employee was penalized in some way because of the conflict. 63
Once the employee proves the elements of a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to show either that it initiated
good faith efforts of reasonable accommodation or that it could
not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue
hardship.
Courts within the Fifth Circuit have stated that Title VII's
reasonable accommodation is a balancing of both employer and
employee interests. Such balancing which protects the employer
by not requiring any accommodation that would impose an
undue hardship while still protecting the employee by requiring
the accommodation be reasonable. 64 Alternatively, courts within
the Eighth Circuit have adopted a two-step analysis in failure to
accommodate cases. The first step asks whether an
accommodation is possible and the second step determines
whether the accommodation is reasonable.6 5  According to
Ansonia, once the employer demonstrates that it has reasonably
accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory
inquiry ends.66 No accommodation is reasonable if it imposes an
undue hardship on the employer. 67 Hardison held that any
61 Id. at 87, 91.
62 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978).
63 Id. at 401.
64 See, e.g., Favero v. Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp. 1281, 1286 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (explaining the acceptable accommodation range which protects the
interests of both the employer and the employee).
65 See, e.g.,Vetter v. Farmaland Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 1287, 1308 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
66 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986).
67 See Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting
that where an employer already provided an accommodation, no showing of undue
hardship is necessary).
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accommodation involving more than de minimis costs to the
employer is undue hardship, yet the costs of accommodation
must not merely be speculative. 68
The Ninth Circuit decided two significant reasonable
accommodation cases in the late 1990's. In Opuku-Boateng v.
State of California,69 the court held for the plaintiff because the
State failed to prove undue hardship. 70 The Ninth Circuit stated
that additional cost in the form of lost efficiency or higher wages
could be considered to determine if the de minimis threshold had
been met. 71 The case involved a plant inspector for the State of
California who was also a Seventh-day Adventist.72 Employees
not subject to a collective bargaining agreement were expected to
work some weekends and holidays. Opuku-Boateng's request for
Saturdays off was denied by the Department. The Department
argued that allowing Opuku-Boateng off on weekends would
cause an undue hardship by imposing on other employees. The
court reversed in favor of Opuku-Boateng stating, "[w]e have not
read Hardison so broadly as to proscribe all differences in
treatment."7
3
In Balint v. Carson City, Nevada,74 the Ninth Circuit
followed Hardison and upheld a valid collective bargaining
agreement over an employee's request for reasonable
accommodation.7 5 As a member of the Worldwide Church of God,
Lisette Balint observed the Sabbath from sundown Friday to
sundown Saturday.76 Balint was offered a position with the
Carson City Sheriffs Department and was informed that
working on weekends was based on a seniority-based bidding
system. The Department asserted that the mere existence of a
seniority system excused them from reasonable accommodation.
The court held that the employer was still obligated to attempt
an accommodation that was consistent with the seniority system
and did not impose more than a de minimis cost.77 The court
68 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
69 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996).
70 Id. at 1475.
71 Id. at 1468 n.1.
72 Id. at 1464-65.
73 Id. at 1469.
74 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999).
75 Id. at 1049.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1049-50.
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cited Hardison for the proposition that a reasonable
accommodation that deprives employees of their shift and job
preferences would constitute unequal treatment of employees
not contemplated by Title VII.78
II. DEFINING "UNDUE HARDSHIP"
A. The De Minimis Standard
The EEOC in 1967 replaced the term "serious
inconvenience" with "undue hardship" in the Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Religion. 79 The EEOC did not provide
a justification for changing the standard other than stating that
they had received several complaints involving religious
discrimination. Prior to 1967, Congress had not drafted the term
"undue hardship" into any employment discrimination
legislation. Pre-amendment, the term was frequently found in
cases concerning jury members, illegal alien deportation and
state zoning laws. This line of cases emphasized the hardship
that was being placed on an individual as a result of government
regulation in a particular circumstance. For example, in a
zoning case the landowner might argue an undue hardship will
occur unless a variance is granted. In Beerman v. City of
Kettering,80 the court described an undue hardship as "a
substantial and unnecessary injustice to the applicant."81 The
term "hardship" has generally been defined as hard
circumstances of life and the term "undue" as excessive or
unreasonable. Combining the terms together generally implied
a significantly difficult situation, which required relief under the
law to achieve justice.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act included the term "undue
hardship" in relation to the discharge of student loans under
Chapter 13.82 In the case of In re Luna, 83 the bankruptcy court
described undue hardship as a type of hardship that results from
extraordinary circumstances that would cause debtor and/or
debtor's dependents extreme hardship if the debt was repaid and
78 Id. at 1052.
79 See 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (2003).
80 237 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
81 Id. at 650.
82 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994).
83 236 B.R. 291 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
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that would continue for the foreseeable future.84 In the case of
In re Hawkins, 85 the bankruptcy court described undue hardship
as "certainty of hopelessness" of repayment, suggesting that only
in the most dire of situations would a debtor be allowed to
discharge a student loan.8 6
In addition to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has injected
the term "undue hardship" into the Rehabilitation Act,8 7 Title
V188 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 89 since 1967.
Under each of these federal statutes, the courts have ascribed a
definition to the term in accordance with its plain meaning. The
Supreme Court in Hardison allowed the employer to avoid
reasonable accommodation if it would impose a minimum
hardship on the employer.
In Hardison, the cost to employ a substitute for Hardison
would have amounted to $150 in overtime pay every three
months. Considering the financial wealth of TWA at that time,
this amount could hardly be considered an undue hardship.
In Burns v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 90 the Ninth
Circuit was confronted with the issue of an employee who
refused to pay union dues because of his sincerely held religious
beliefs. 91 Before he was discharged, Duane Burns offered to pay
his union dues to a charity instead of the union. The employer
recommended Burns pay the dues to the union but not become a
union member. 92 The employer argued that keeping track of the
payments to charities would cause undue hardship.93
The Ninth Circuit held that Burns had "fully met his burden
of proving a prima facie case of religious discrimination."94 He
proved that he had a bona fide religious belief, he informed his
employer and the Union of his religious belief, and he was
thereafter threatened with discharge for his refusal to comply
with the collective bargaining agreement. The court described
84 Id. at 293.
85 187 B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995).
86 Id. at 298.
87 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2000).
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
89 Id. at § 1211(10) (2000).
90 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
91 Id. at 405.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 407.
94 Id. at 405.
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the employer's obligation of reasonable accommodation: "Once
the employer has made more than a negligible effort to
accommodate the employee and that effort is viewed by the
worker as inadequate, the question becomes whether the further
accommodation requested would constitute 'undue hardship."'95
The court held that the administrative cost of accommodating
Burns's religious beliefs would not cause the employer undue
hardship .96
The second case involving a collective bargaining agreement
decided by the Ninth Circuit was Yott v. North American
Rockwell Corporation.97 Kenneth Yott was discharged because
he followed the tenets of his religion, which prohibited the
payment of union dues. Yott began working for North American
Rockwell in 1947, at which time union dues were not required.
In 1968, a provision was inserted into the collective bargaining
agreement mandating the payment of union dues by all
employees. Prior to his termination, Yott suggested three
alternatives to his payment of union dues, all of which were
rejected. 98
In Yott, the Ninth Circuit fell back on Hardison and noted
that the Supreme Court held that "where the impact upon co-
workers or cost of an accommodation proposal is greater than de
minimis, undue hardship is demonstrated. '" 99 The court further
reasoned that to allow Yott to receive an accommodation might
constitute preferential treatment over other employees in the
bargaining unit and escalate animosity between union and non-
union employees. The Ninth Circuit commented on the de
minimis standard: "Furthermore, a standard less difficult to
satisfy than the 'de minimis' standard for demonstrating undue
hardship expressed in Hardison is difficult to imagine."'100
The Ninth Circuit has followed the lead of Hardison by
diminishing the standard to one that is negligible, or equally
simple, for the employer to satisfy.
95 Id. at 406 (citation omitted).
96 Id. at 405-06, 407.
97 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979).
98 Id. at 907.
99 Id. at 908 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).
100 Id. at 909.
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III. WEAKENING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The courts have weakened reasonable accommodation rights
in the workplace through a number of mechanisms. Since
employers need only provide a reasonable accommodation to the
extent of a de minimis cost, the courts have allowed employers to
meet the threshold by presenting evidence of potential workplace
disruption and imposition on co-worker rights. Both of these
defenses permit the court to speculate as to the consequences of
allowing the reasonable accommodation.
A. Workplace Disruption
One of the first cases to validate the workplace disruption
defense was EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc.'01 Mohan Tucker,
responding to an advertisement, applied for employment as a
restaurant manager at the regional office of Sambo's
Restaurants in Murietta, Georgia.10 2 At the time, Tucker was
employed by a Pizza Hut Restaurant in the Atlanta area.
Tucker filled out the application and upon presenting it to a
Sambo's representative was instructed that if he was accepted as
a manager trainee he would have to shave his beard in
accordance with company grooming standards. Tucker
responded that he was forbidden to shave his facial hair by his
religion.103 Tucker, a practicing Sikh, was forbidden to cut or
shave his facial hair except in medical emergencies.
The company recruiter responded that no exceptions would
be made to the grooming standard and, on that basis, his
application was denied. Tucker brought suit under Title VII for
failure to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. The
EEOC investigated and determined that Sambo's had made a
showing of reasonable cause. Sambo's had established a uniform
grooming policy for all of its 1100 restaurants that prohibited
facial hair with the exception of neatly-trimmed mustaches.'0 4
Sambo's argued its policy was necessary in order to promote
their public image and that customers prefer managers and
employees that are clean-shaven. The district court upheld
101 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
102 Id. at 88.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 89.
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Sambo's grooming policy finding no violation of Title VII and
citing Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 05 which upheld a grooming
policy that prohibited facial hair as a business necessity. 10 6 The
district court concluded that the relaxation of Sambo's grooming
policy would impose an undue hardship on the business.
The court considered the possible effects of allowing an
exception to the company's grooming policy from the perspective
of the employer's business strategy. Yet, the court concluded
that allowing an exception to Sambo's grooming policy would
have a negative effect on the business operation. The court
reasoned, "Exceptions to the grooming standards of Sambo's
Restaurants would have an adverse effect on the Sambo's system
as a whole and thus Sambo's has never knowingly permitted any
exceptions." 10 7 Evidence was produced during the trial which
proved that a significant segment of the consuming public would
not accept restaurant employees with beards. The court
accorded substantial weight to Sambo's business policies in
finding that no undue hardship was present.
Another example of the courts use of the workplace
disruption doctrine came from the Seventh Circuit in Anderson
v. U.S.F. Logistics.10 8 Elizabeth Anderson worked for U.S.F.
Logistics as an office coordinator. Anderson, a follower of the
Christian Methodist Episcopal faith, would tell people to "Have a
Blessed Day" when signing off to correspondence or as a way to
end a telephone conversation. 10 9 Anderson did not use the
phrase all the time and, when confronted by her supervisor
about it, stated that she would not use the phrase with anyone
who did not want to hear it. Anderson never received any
complaints about using the phrase until June of 1999 when an
employee of U.S.F., Mark LaRussa, a liaison to Microsoft, told
her the comment was unacceptable. Anderson was instructed by
her employer not to use the phrase in any correspondence with
Microsoft. 110
Anderson, however, continued to use the phrase arguing
that it was part of her religious practice and was reprimanded by
105 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976), affd, 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978).
106 Id. at 43.
107 Sambo's, 530 F. Supp. at 89.
108 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001).
109 Id. at 473.
ll0 Id.
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her supervisor as a result."' Several months later, a Microsoft
spokesman was quoted in an Indianapolis newspaper as saying
that Microsoft did not have a problem with the use of the phrase
"Have a Blessed Day." Anderson continued to use the phrase in
correspondence with Microsoft and was reprimanded a second
time for use of the phrase. Subsequently, Anderson filed a
complaint seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction.
The district court denied the preliminary injunction, which
was later affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. The circuit court
reasoned that because Anderson was not required by her religion
to use the phrase all the time, the employer's acquiescence,
allowing Anderson to use the phrase with co-workers, was a
reasonable accommodation and the company had no further
obligation. 112 In addition, the court considered the potential
impact of using the phrase when corresponding with Microsoft.
The court noted that Microsoft had not officially informed U.S.F.
that the phrase was acceptable, "[t]hus, the evidence [suggested]
that Anderson's religious practice could damage U.S.F.'s
relationship with Microsoft."' 1 3
Anderson believed she was to end her conversations with
people by using the phrase "Have a Blessed Day." She was
willing to forego use of the phrase if the recipient was offended
by it or expressed a desire not to have the phrase used. In all
other cases, Anderson believed it was her religious duty to use
the phrase.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a reasonable
accommodation would be accomplished if Anderson were still
permitted to use the phrase with co-workers. The court
speculated as to the potential impact to the business relationship
with Microsoft considering that Microsoft had stated that they
were not offended by use of the phrase. The court allowed the
complaint of one employee to come before the accommodation
rights of Anderson, despite the fact that the effect on the
business was mere speculation. Anderson's case was dismissed
for failure to prove a prima facie case.
111 Id. at 473-74.
112 Id. at 476.
113 Id. at 476-77.
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B. Imposing on Co-Workers
In Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc.," 4 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of the motion for summary
judgment in favor of the employer. 115 Lynn Weber was hired by
Roadway Express as a truck driver. Weber informed Roadway
that, as a Jehovah's Witness, his religious beliefs would not
allow him to make long-haul overnight runs with a female
partner who was not his wife. Weber's supervisor informed him
that working with women was part of his job and that if he could
not work with women he would not receive any driving
assignments. Drivers when initially hired are dispatched on an
as-needed basis. 116
Weber argued that Roadway could accommodate his
religious practices by skipping over him when an assignment
came up with a female driver. Weber stated that Roadway
already had allowed drivers to be skipped over for other reasons.
117 The court acknowledged that if Weber were under a collective
bargaining agreement, its analysis would be different. 118 The
casual drivers are dispatched in the order in which they have
returned from other runs. Driver compensation depends on the
number of miles logged. 119
The court considered the effect that skipping over Weber
might have on other casual drivers waiting for a run. The
district court surmised that skipping over Weber to avoid pairing
with a female partner may adversely affect other drivers. The
court then provided several examples of the potential ways other
drivers could be adversely affected. The court stated, "The mere
possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of
'skipping over' is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship." 120
The Fifth Circuit cited Hardison for the principle that shift-
skipping, when it would affect other employees, is an undue
hardship. 121 The court reasoned that driver-skipping for flexible,
secular reasons was de minimis, but that Weber's being skipped
114 199 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2000).
115 Id. at 275.
116 Id. at 272.
117 Id. at 273.
118 Id. at 273-74 n.3.
119 Id. at 272.
120 Id. at 274.
121 Id.
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over was inflexible and therefore an undue hardship. Weber's
case was dismissed by the district court and affirmed on
appeal.122
IV. REDEFINING SINCERITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Some courts have scrutinized the religious beliefs and
practices of the employee as a means to dismiss a reasonable
accommodation case. If the court concluded that the employee's
religious beliefs were insincere, the employee would not be able
to prove the prima facie case, and thus would not be entitled to
reasonable accommodation. In the case of Tiano v. Dillard
Department Stores,123 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the defendant was not in violation of Title VII. 124
Mary Tiano worked for Dillard's Stores as shoe salesperson until
she was terminated in October 1988. Tiano, a devout Roman
Catholic, learned of a pilgrimage to Medjugorje, Yugoslavia,
where several people have claimed that the Virgin Mary has
appeared to them. Tiano testified that on August 22, 1988, she
had a calling from God to attend the pilgrimage.
Tiano spoke with her supervisor, the operations manager,
and the store manager concerning her trip to Medjugorje in
October. 125 At every level, Tiano's request to take unpaid leave
was denied. Dillard's Stores had the policy of not allowing any
employee leaves from October to December due to the busy
holidays. Tiano asked to be transferred to another store, for
which she was supplied the paperwork. She was informed that if
she left on the pilgrimage she would not have a job when she
returned. Tiano attended the pilgrimage and, in her absence,
her immediate supervisor filled in for her. 126
"The district court found that Tiano established a prima
facie case of religious discrimination and that Dillard's failed to
[make] a good faith effort to accommodate her belief or [show]
that undue hardship would result."127 The district court also
found that Tiano had a bona fide religious belief that she had a
122 Id. at 275.
123 139 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 1998).
124 Id. at 680.
125 Id. at 680-81.
126 Id. at 681.
127 Id. at 682.
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calling from God to attend the pilgrimage between October 17
and October 26. On appeal, the court held that Tiano had a bona
fide religious belief that she had to go to Medjugorje, but not
necessarily during October. The Court of Appeals placed great
weight on the testimony of Tiano's friend that stated the
pilgrimage could occur at another time and suggested that the
trip's timing was a personal preference. They disregarded the
direct testimony of Tiano that her religious convictions required
her to go in October.
The appellate court concluded that Tiano failed to prove a
conflict between a bona fide religious belief and her employment
duty, ending the inquiry before discussing any reasonable
accommodation or undue hardship. 128 The district court's ruling
that Dillard's made no attempt to accommodate the religious
beliefs of Tiano was reversed.
The second case involving a challenge to an employee's
religious beliefs was Wilson v. U.S. West Communications.129
U.S. West employed Christine Wilson for nearly 20 years as an
information specialist. 130 In July of 1990, Wilson, a Roman
Catholic, made a religious vow to wear a pro-life button at all
times. Wilson strongly believed that the Virgin Mary wanted
her to wear the button and that taking off the button could cause
her to lose her soul. Wilson was asked on several occasions to
remove the button at work because it offended co-workers. 131
Wilson's supervisor told her that the button was causing co-
workers complaints and some were refusing to work. Wilson's
supervisor gave her three options: (1) wear the button only in her
cubicle; (2) cover the button while at work; or (3) wear a different
button with the same message but no photograph. 132 Wilson
responded that none of the options were acceptable and that if
she took one of the options she would break her promise to God.
Wilson considered herself to be a living witness. Wilson was
sent home for wearing the button and subsequently fired for
missing three consecutive days.133 U.S. West did not have a
dress code or policy against wearing buttons or other types of
128 Id. at 683.
129 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
130 Id. at 1338.
131 Id. at 1339.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1340.
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clothing. 134
The district court held that Wilson was provided a
reasonable accommodation of covering the button and entered
judgment for U.S. West.135 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court. The Eighth Circuit agreed that despite Wilson's
statements about being compelled to be a living witness, she
could not be believed. 13 6 The court placed great weight on some
evidence that suggested Wilson's sincere religious beliefs did not
include being a living witness.The court ended the inquiry after
concluding that a reasonable accommodation had been provided.
137 In doing so, the court dictated to the employee what her
religious beliefs should be.
V. THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
Congress has recognized that employees have minimal
protection of their religious beliefs and practices when a conflict
exists with an employment requirement. The Sears Roebuck
case, in which Sears summarily rejected applicants for
employment on the basis of their Sabbath observance, brought
the issue to the forefront. 138 The case of Cora Miller, who was
fired from Chi-Chi's restaurant near Washington, D.C. because
she refused to sing "Happy Birthday" to customers, also brought
public attention.139 Miller, as a Jehovah's Witness, held religious
beliefs that forbid her to celebrate birthdays. Congress has
realized that some employees have had to choose between their
religion and their job.
In 1994, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) was
introduced to provide employees with significantly more
protection of their religious practices and observances in the
workplace. 140 The legislation has not yet passed Congress but
has been reintroduced in every session since 1994. A broad-
based coalition of religious groups has been lobbying for the
WRFA over the past decade. The WRFA would amend Section
701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by providing clarity to the
134 Id. at 1339.
135 Id. at 1340.
136 Id. at 1341.
137 Id. at 1342.
138 See Kaminer, supra note 3.
139 See Mark Hansen, Suing Bosses over Beliefs, 84 A.B.A. J. 30 (1998).
140 See Kaminer, supra note 3.
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definition of undue hardship. It reads as follows: "In this
subsection, the term 'undue hardship' means an accommodation
requiring significant difficulty or expense. 141
The WRFA adopts an undue hardship definition similar to
that of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It discards the de
minimis standard as set forth by the Supreme Court in Hardison
and specifically outlines a number of factors to consider when
determining if the threshold "significant difficulty or expense"
standard has been met. It identifies the three factors as: "(i) the
identifiable cost of the accommodation"; (ii) the overall financial
resources and size of the employer involved; and (iii) for the
employer "with multiple facilities, the geographic separateness
or administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities."142 The
criteria as enumerated by the WRFA make it less likely that the
employer will be able to merely speculate what the
accommodation will cost.
In addition, WRFA takes the vagueness out of the term
reasonable accommodation.What may seem reasonable to the
employer may not be reasonable to the employee. It provides
guidance through the following provision:
For purposes of determining whether an employer
has committed an unlawful employment practice
under this title by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation to the religious observance or
practice of an employee, for an accommodation to
be considered to be reasonable, the accommodation
shall remove the conflict between employment
requirements and the religious observance or
practice of the employee. 43
This provision insures that employers consider which
accommodation will remove the conflict. In many instances, the
courts have held an accommodation, which did not provide relief
to the religious employee, to be reasonable. Take, for example,
Teresa George who was fired by Home Depot for not reporting to
work on Sundays.144 George had talked with her supervisor
141 S.893, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
142 Id. § 3.
143 Id.
144 See George v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 00-2616, 2001 WL 1558315, at *5 (E.D.
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about her religious beliefs requiring her to observe Sunday as
the Sabbath. George requested that she be allowed to take the
entire day off to observe her Sabbath. Bordelon, her supervisor,
responded that he knew Catholics could work on Sunday and
offered George the option of taking off time to attend mass on
Sunday, after which she would have to return to work or be
fired. The district court held that Home Depot had fulfilled its
duty under Title VII by offering George a reasonable
accommodation, stating that "[a]llowing George to dictate the
days when she would work is not a reasonable
accommodation."' 145 Teresa George's religious beliefs were so
strongly held that she was willing to forego her position at Home
Depot. It is in just such an instance that the WRFA would
provide the protections a religious employee needs to avoid
having to choose between her religion and a job.
The WRFA has been promoted by a coalition of religious
organizations and critically reviewed by others. One legal
scholar has analyzed the WRFA, calling it a "lemon," and
concluded that it would violate the Establishment Clause. 146 The
article applied the three-pronged Lemon Test to the WRFA. 147
The author concluded that requiring more than a de minimis
expense to reasonably accommodate would fail under the second
prong of the test by advancing religion.148 Critics argue that the
Supreme Court placed limits on reasonable accommodation in
Hardison and that any greater burden will trigger constitutional
prohibitions. In addition, it is argued that the WRFA requires
the employer to remove the conflict and succumb to the religious
employees' accommodation, thus advancing religion. 149 In light
of the general concern over the Lemon Test among Supreme
La. 2001).
145 Id. at *8.
146 Gregory J. Gawlik, The Politics of Religion: "Reasonable Accommodation"
and the Establishment Clause an Analysis of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act,
47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 275 (1999).
147 Id. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the Supreme Court
outlined the three prong test to be followed in Establishment Clause cases. A
statute, to be consistent with the Establishment Clause, must comply with the
following: (1) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose"; (2) "its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3)
"the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion."' Id. (quoting
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
148 See Gawlik, supra note 138 at 262.
149 Id. at 264-65.
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Court justices, predicting the outcome of a constitutional
challenge to the WRFA seems premature.1 50
CONCLUSION
The enactment of Title VII created hopes that
discrimination based upon membership in a protected class
would be stricken from the workplace. Religion as a protected
class assumes a sincerely held belief system, which translates
into some level of everyday religious practices. An employer
would have no occasion to know that an employee is religious
unless some practicing of the employee's religion occurs. The
inevitable result of protecting an employee's religion is to also
protect the practice. Congress amended Title VII by adding
"reasonable accommodation" to resolve conflicts that arise in the
workplace between religious practices and employment
requirements.
According to the pre-code EEOC guidelines, Congressional
history, and some justices on the Supreme Court, the spirit of
reasonable accommodation was to mandate that the employer
make an effort to resolve a conflict between an employee's
religious practice and an employment requirement. If the
parties could not reach a resolution voluntarily, the interests of
the business would be balanced against the employee's freedom
of religious exercise. Employee free-exercise rights were to be
accommodated unless it caused an undue hardship. The spirit of
reasonable accommodation sought to protect minority religions
despite the potential to treat other employees unequally. The
Congressional history strongly suggests that religious interests
should take precedence over secular interests since the statute
does not specifically protect secular ideals.
The Supreme Court, through Hardison and Ansonia, has
diminished the reasonable accommodation provision. Congress
failed to specifically define "undue hardship" thereby leaving the
Supreme Court the opportunity to set the parameters. The
Supreme Court defined "undue hardship" in terms of de minimis:
no more than a de minimis burden on the employer would be
allowed in accommodation cases. The high court opened the door
150 Several of the Supreme Court Justices have advocated altering our present
Establishment Clause framework.
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to an expansion of the employer's rights to mandate business
policy, superceding employee reasonable accommodation.
Business efficiency, lack of workplace disruption, and equal
treatment of all employees have become justifications for
curtailing an employee's religious practices. Workplace
disruption and alteration of business operation can occur
anytime the employer decides to expedite changes in personnel
or policy.
Allowing employers to rigidly enforce workplace rules
irrespective of religious practices denigrates the free exercise of
religion and can create hostility toward religion. The de minimis
standard sends the implicit message that religious beliefs and
practices are of minimal value to the workplace. Elevating the
secular over the sectarian in the workplace denies the spirit of
reasonable accommodation. The Supreme Court has tipped the
balance in favor of the employer in determining what is a
reasonable accommodation. Those outside the religion often
perceive religious beliefs and practices as irrational. The
protection of minority religions, which are generally not well
understood by employers, was one objective of the amendment.
The courts tend to interpret "reasonable" from the perspective of
the reasonable employer, instead of asking what would be
reasonable to the religious employee under the same
circumstances. Working with employees to reach an equitable
resolution from the employee's perspective fulfills the intent
behind reasonable accommodation provisions and accords
significance to the religious beliefs of the employee.
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act, as most recently
introduced in Congress, attempts to clarify reasonable
accommodation by defining the terms "undue hardship" and
"reasonable." The WRFA not only affirms the employer's
responsibility to work with the employee to find an
accommodation, but also promotes a dialog concerning what the
employee believes to be reasonable in the situation. Since it is
the employee that must bring the conflict to the employer's
attention, the employee is allowed to initially frame the issue.
Employers under the WRFA will not be permitted to insert their
notions of what is "reasonable" unless the conflict from the
employee's perspective is removed. Removal of the conflict may
cause an undue hardship to the employer, but only if it involves
significant difficulty or expense. The de minimis standard
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appears to have been intentionally written out of the WRFA.
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